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This paper examines entry deterrence and signaling when an incumbent firm experiences a capacity 
constraint, arising from either her productive efficiency or the high market demand she faces. In both 
cases, we demonstrate that separating and pooling equilibria can be sustained. Our results show that if 
the costs that constrained and unconstrained incumbents face when expanding their facilities are 
substantially different, the separating equilibrium can be supported under large parameter values. In 
this case, information is perfectly transmitted to the entrant. If, in contrast, both types of incumbent 
face similar expansion costs, a policy reducing expansion costs can help move the industry from a 
pooling equilibrium to the separating equilibrium with associated efficient entry. Nonetheless, our 
results show that if this policy is overemphasized entry patterns remain unaffected, suggesting a 
potential disadvantage of policies that significantly reduce firms’ expansion costs. 
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1. Introduction 
Capacity constraints constitute a limiting factor for industries experiencing a sudden increase in demand. 
Indeed, some firms may only be able to satisfy additional demand by producing at higher marginal costs, 
while others may find it extremely costly to produce above their current capacity, thus making them 
unable to satisfy unexpected increases in demand. An expansion of the current facility might be an 
attractive option, since it alleviates such capacity constraint. In the absence of entry threats, firms expand 
if their direct benefits from expanding are positive, i.e., if the increase in future profits associated to the 
expansion offset expansion costs. Under entry threats, however, firms must consider not only this direct 
benefit but also the indirect effects that such expansion might entail. In particular, expansion might signal 
a high demand and attract potential entrants to the industry, thus suggesting that firms suffering a capacity 
constraint might face a tradeoff when considering whether or not to expand their facility. Such a tradeoff 
is specifically relevant in periods of economic recovery, where several firms start experiencing larger 
customer traffic and sales, making them more likely to experience capacity constraints.
1 
In this paper we examine this tradeoff by studying entry deterrence in a context where the 
incumbent is privately informed about her capacity constraint. Specifically, the incumbent is constrained 
if she cannot produce her profit-maximizing output because she faces a limited plant capacity. This 
occurs, for instance, when her technological efficiency or the market demand she faces are relatively high. 
In contrast, an unconstrained incumbent can produce her profit-maximizing output. Our model considers 
that, first, the incumbent chooses whether to expand her facility  where the fixed costs from such 
expansion may differ between the constrained and unconstrained type of incumbent. The potential entrant 
does not observe whether the incumbent suffers a capacity constraint, and must therefore base her entry 
decision on the information he infers from the incumbent’s expansion.  
We first show that both separating and pooling equilibria can be sustained, where information is 
either perfectly conveyed to the potential entrant or concealed from him, respectively.
2 In the separating 
equilibrium, such information allows the entrant to base his entry decision on more accurate information 
about his post-entry competition. In contrast, in the pooling equilibrium the entrant cannot accurately 
assess the profitability of the market, and thus may enter a market that is actually unprofitable. Hence, the 
separating equilibrium supports entry in similar contexts as under complete information. Instead, the 
                                                 
1 Industries that have recently reported relatively severe capacity constraints include, among others, the oil industry 
(as documented by the U.S. Energy Information Administration), the biopharmaceutical manufacturing industry (as 
reported in a survey conducted among European and U.S. firms by BioPlan Associates, Inc.), and the freight-
transportation industry (according to the University of Denver’s Intermodal Transportation Institute). 
2 In addition, both the separating and pooling equilibria survive standard equilibrium refinements in signaling 
games, i.e., the Cho and Kreps’ (1987) Intuitive Criterion, under relatively general parameter conditions. 2 
 
pooling equilibrium predicts possible entry in industries that the entrant would have avoided under 
complete information, entailing negative net profits for the entrant and subsequent exit.  
The fully informative separating equilibrium can be sustained, specifically, when the constrained 
incumbent faces relatively lower expansion costs than the unconstrained firm. This difference in 
expansion costs might arise if, for instance, financial institutions discriminate constrained and 
unconstrained incumbents, charging different financial costs to each type. In this case, only the separating 
equilibrium arises where, as suggested above, entry patterns coincide with those under complete 
information, and no policy intervention is needed.  In other contexts, both types of firm might face 
relatively similar expansion costs, illustrating situations where financial markets are not capable of 
differentiating constrained and unconstrained incumbents, thus charging both types of incumbent similar 
financial costs. In this setting, our paper shows that government intervention might be welfare improving 
under certain conditions, even when the regulator is uninformed about the incumbent’s cost structure. In 
particular, we demonstrate that a policy reducing the financial costs associated with expansion induces a 
change in the equilibrium outcome from a pooling to a separating equilibrium.
3 We also predict that, 
despite the potential benefits from lowering financial costs —inducing similar entry patterns as under 
complete information— such policy can be easily overdone, which occurs when expansion costs are 
reduced beyond certain levels. In particular, under extremely low expansion costs, both types of 
incumbent expand their facilities, changing the equilibrium prediction, from a pooling equilibrium where 
no type of incumbent expands to one where both types expand. However, entry patterns coincide in the 
pooling equilibrium with and without expansion.  
Our results are especially useful for predicting the potential effects of federal and state policies 
reducing firms’ expansion costs. After the economic crisis, several firms have started to experience larger 
customer traffic and sales.
4 In this context, policies reducing expansion costs to both constrained and 
unconstrained firms can help businesses expand. As suggested above, if these policies are overdone, they 
might entail entry in contexts where it would not have occurred under complete information. Specifically, 
our equilibrium predictions imply that such policies can deter entry in markets where high demand 
actually supports the entry of new competitors, or attract entry in contexts where demand is still low.      
                                                 
3 Our results depend on the severity of the capacity constraint. In particular, when capacity constraints are not 
severe, no type of incumbent significantly benefits from breaking her capacity constraint. In this case, a policy 
reducing financial costs would only switch the particular pooling equilibrium being played, namely, from one where 
no type of incumbent expands to one where both firms expand. Hence, under weak capacity constraints our paper 
suggests that a policy reducing both firms’ financial costs is futile, since it does not modify the entry patterns that 
can arise in the pooling equilibria of the game. 
4 In the last Christmas season, for instance, Bloomberg reported a 5.5% increase in sales among U.S. retailers (see 
Bloomberg.com on December 28th, 2010), while the Wall Street Journal recorded a 4.2% sales increase among 
chain-stores (December 21st, 2010), relative to the same period in 2009. 3 
 
Our equilibrium results hold under relatively general conditions. First, the incumbent’s capacity 
constraint can arise from her high efficiency level or high market demand, indicating that our conclusions 
can be applied to settings where firms are privately informed about their capacity constraint, regardless of 
the source of such constraint. Second, the paper’s equilibrium predictions are not qualitatively affected 
whether or not the incumbent’s capacity constraint is very severe. To illustrate our results, we present a 
parametric example with linear demand and constant marginal costs in the appendix. 
This paper contributes to both the literature pertaining to capacity constraints under complete 
information contexts, and that on signaling in entry-deterrence games. On one hand, Dixit’s seminal work 
(1979, 1980) —analyzing the incentives for an incumbent to deter entry by expanding her capacity in a 
two-period game— has been expanded in other studies where both incumbent and entrant are perfectly 
informed. Specifically, Ware (1984) examines entry deterrence in a three-stage game, and Formby and 
Smith (1984) and Mason and Nowell (1992) study the incumbent’s incentives to allow entry and then 
collude with the entrant. The role of capacity constraints as an entry deterrence device has, however, been 
analyzed using complete information settings, wherein every firm is able to perfectly observe other firms’ 
cost structure. This assumption may not be sensible in certain industries that have been monopolized for 
long periods of time, where entrants have access to very limited information about the incumbent’s cost 
structure or the precise market demand. Our paper hence contributes to the literature on capacity 
constraints by relaxing this assumption and allowing for incomplete information.
5 
On the other hand, this paper builds upon the literature on entry deterrence in signaling games, 
such as Milgrom and Roberts (1982) where the entrant is uncertain about the incumbent’s unit costs.
6 In 
their setting, only the separating equilibrium can survive standard equilibrium refinements. In our model, 
in contrast, incomplete information about the incumbent’s capacity constraint (or market demand) does 
not necessarily imply that the constrained incumbent experiences greater benefits from investing in 
additional capacity than the unconstrained incumbent.
7 As the Single-Crossing Property does not 
                                                 
5 Arvan (1986) considers an incomplete information version of Dixit’s (1980) model but focuses on type-dependent 
strategy profiles, unlike our paper that examines both type-dependent and type-independent strategy profiles. In 
addition, our model allows for capacity constraints to stem from both the incumbent’s efficiency level and market 
demand. 
6 In an extension to Milgrom and Roberts’ (1982), Harrington (1986) allows for the possibility that the entrant is 
uncertain about his own costs after entry. Interestingly, this article shows that when the costs of the entrant and the 
incumbent are sufficiently positively correlated then Milgrom and Roberts’ (1982) results are reversed. That is, the 
incumbent's production is below the simple monopoly output in order to strategically deter entry. Our model is 
different from Harrington (1986) because in our setting both firms know each other’s costs, but the entrant is 
uninformed about the incumbent’s capacity constraint. 
7 Essentially, the constrained incumbent experiences a larger increase in profits from expanding her facility than her 
unconstrained counterpart if entry is deterred, but may experience a smaller increase if entry follows. As we show in 
the paper, this result holds even when the constrained incumbent can finance her expansion at a lower cost than the 
unconstrained incumbent. 4 
 
necessarily hold in our model, both separating and pooling equilibria can be sustained in equilibrium and 
survive equilibrium refinements. 
Another related article is Matthews and Mirman (1983), where the incumbent sets prices that can 
communicate information about market profitability to potential entrants as in our model. However, the 
actual price in the market (which is also the message observed by the potential entrant) receives a random 
shock, given that the incumbent sets prices before demand is actually realized. In contrast, we assume that 
market demand or capacity constraints are perfectly observed by the incumbent across periods.
8 In a 
recent article, Ridley (2008) analyzes an environment where an informed firm’s entry provides a noisy 
signal about market demand to additional entrants. We consider, however, that the expansion decision of 
the informed firm may have a favorable effect on her technology, whereas Ridley (2008) assumes that the 
cost structure is unaffected. This implies that the informative separating equilibrium can arise in our 
model only if the incumbent’s expansion produces strong technological benefits in addition to serving as 
a signal to potential entrants. Finally, Espinola-Arredondo et al. (in press) considers a similar information 
structure, where the incumbent is perfectly informed about market demand and chooses whether to invest 
in cost-reducing technologies. In their model, however, the incumbent is never limited by a capacity 
constraint, and the investment helps the incumbent lower her marginal cost in all units. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 describes our 
equilibrium predictions. Section 4 examines two extensions to our model, showing that the equilibrium 
results are qualitatively unaffected. Section 5 elaborates on the policy implications of our results and the 
last section concludes.  
 
2. Model 
Consider a market with a monopolist (she) and a potential entrant (he) with inverse demand function 
() p Q   which satisfies  '( ) 0 pQ   and  ''( ) 0 pQ . The monopolist is perfectly informed about her 
(constant) marginal production costs being low, cL, or high, cH, where p(0)>cH>cL≥0. In order to introduce 
the effect of the capacity constraint, we consider that the low-cost incumbent’s profit-maximizing output 
exceeds her production capacity, q , whereas that of the high-cost incumbent does not. The monopolist 
decides whether to expand her facility (which allows the low-cost incumbent to produce her profit-
maximizing output in future periods) or to not expand. The time structure of this incomplete information 
game is described as follows: 
                                                 
8 Bagwell and Ramey (1990) and Albaek and Overgaard (1994) examine a similar entry deterrence in a model where 
the potential entrant can perfectly observe both the incumbent's pre-entry pricing strategy and its advertising 
expenditures. In contrast, we restrict the amount of information available to the entrant to the expansion decision of 
the incumbent. 5 
 
1.  Nature determines the incumbent’s marginal costs: high cH with probability p, or low cL with 
probability 1-p. The incumbent privately observes her cost structure, but the entrant does not. 
2.  After observing her cost structure, the incumbent decides whether to expand her facility. 
3.  After observing the incumbent’s expansion (or no expansion) decision, the entrant updates his 
beliefs about the incumbent’s costs. Let  (| ) H Exp   and  (| ) H NoExp   denote the entrant’s 
posterior beliefs about a high-cost incumbent after observing expansion or no expansion, 
respectively. 
4.  Given these beliefs, the entrant decides whether to enter the incumbent’s market or to remain in a 
perfectly competitive market with associated zero economic profits.   
 
We assume that expansion is costly and specify by KH and KL to be the incumbent’s expansion 
costs when her marginal production costs are high and low, respectively. For generality, we do not restrict 
expansion costs KH and KL.
9 In order to make the entry decision interesting, we consider that the entrant’s 
marginal costs are high. As a consequence, he has incentives to enter (stay out) when the incumbent’s 
costs are high (low, respectively). In addition, we assume that the entrant must incur a fixed entry cost 
F>0 while his entry costs are zero if he remains in the perfectly competitive industry.  




let subscript “i,K” indicate firm i={inc,ent} (incumbent 
or entrant) when the incumbent’s marginal costs are K={H,L}, whereas superscript S denotes the 
particular market structure in which the firm operates S={M,D}, either monopoly or duopoly. For 
instance,  ,
M
inc H q  denotes the monopoly profit-maximizing output for the high-cost incumbent. In particular, 
note that  ,
M




inc H  , where superscript NE denotes that the incumbent did not expand her facility.
10 In contrast, the 
low-cost incumbent’s profit-maximizing output,  ,
M
inc L q , satisfies  ,
M
inc L qq   given that she faces a capacity 




inc L q  to 
represent her monopoly profits when she does not expand, where   
,,
,,
M NE M E
inc L inc L q   . Intuitively, this 
allows the capacity constraint to take several forms: from an extreme context where output cannot be 
further increased beyond q , to milder settings where the incumbent’s marginal cost experiences an 
                                                 
9 Expansion costs might be weakly lower for the most efficient incumbent, i.e.,  H L K K  . Intuitively, this might 
occur when the incumbent uses a share of previous period profits to finance her expansion decision. We elaborate on 
this specific case in our discussion of the equilibrium results (Section 5). 
10 Note that superscript NE is thereafter used in first period profits since the incumbent did not have the chance to 
expand her facility yet. In our description of output and profit decisions during the second period, however, this 
superscript can either be E or NE to denote that the incumbent expanded (did not expand, respectively). 6 
 
increase for all units surpassing capacity level q ; as in Dixit (1980). Under both circumstances, 
nonetheless, the constrained (low cost) incumbent enjoys an increase in her profits when she relaxes 








inc L  . 
Second period, No entry. In the second period, if there is no entry and the incumbent does not 








inc L q  , respectively), 





inc H H K   , where 
,,
,,
M EM N E
inc H inc H   ,
 
since this incumbent did not originally face a capacity 
constraint.
11 The low-cost incumbent, however, faces a capacity constraint q  and her expansion decision 
helps produce her profit-maximizing output  ,
M









i n cL i n cL q   . 
Second period, Entry. If entry occurs, firms compete as Cournot duopolists. Let us first analyze 









ent H F    for incumbent and entrant, respectively. Intuitively, the entrant 
obtains a positive profit from entering, since he competes with a high-cost incumbent. If, in contrast, the 




inc L q  in the 
case that she did not expand her facility. In this section, we consider that this incumbent also faces a 
capacity constraint under duopoly.
12 Intuitively, the capacity constraint she faces is relatively strong, 













ent L F   . 
Let us now examine the case where the incumbent expands her facility. The high-cost 








ent H F    . 
Intuitively, note that 
,,
,,
D ED N E
iH iH    for both firms i={inc,ent} since the production capacity of the high-
cost incumbent is unaffected by her expansion decision. Finally, if the incumbent’s costs are low, her 




inc L qq  , and yielding profits 
                                                 
11 This implies that the unconstrained monopolist does not modify her sales after expanding her facility and, as 
suggested below, her benefits from expansion arise only if entry is deterred. 
12 At the end of section 3 we relax this assumption and show that our equilibrium results are not qualitatively 
affected. In particular, we allow for the capacity constraint to be binding (not binding) under monopoly (duopoly, 
respectively). Thus, the capacity constraint will not be as severe as in our current analysis, where it affects the 
incumbent both under monopoly and duopoly. Note that this assumption can alternatively be interpreted in terms of 
the efficiency of the low-cost incumbent. Specifically, for a given capacity constraint, a decrease in her marginal 









ent L F   for the incumbent and entrant, respectively. As suggested above, the entrant has 




D NE D NE









2.1.  Expansion benefits 
On one hand, the expansion decision produces a direct benefit from enlarging her facility (“breaking” the 
capacity constraint), which allows the incumbent to produce using her efficient cost structure. 
Importantly, note that only the low-cost incumbent enjoys this direct benefit, since her production is 
limited by the capacity constraint, whereas the high-cost incumbent does not. On the other hand, 




L inc L inc L BCC q   
 
denote the benefits from breaking the capacity constraint for the low-cost 




K inc K inc K PLE     represent the profits loss that the K-
type incumbent suffers due to entry, where K={H,L}. If despite not expanding her facility, entry follows, 
the low-cost incumbent experiences a profit loss of 
,,
,, () () 0
NE M NE D NE
Li n c L i n c L PLE q q    .
15 Finally, note that 




H i n cH i n cH PLE  , coincides 
with that when he does not, 
,,
,,
NE M NE D NE
H inc H inc H PLE   , since 
,,
,,
M EM N E
inc H inc H  
 
under monopoly and 
,,
,,
D ED N E
inc H inc H  
 
under duopoly. 
Hence, if expansion deters entry, the low-cost incumbent benefits from BCCL, while the high-cost 
incumbent obtains no benefits or losses. If, in contrast, expansion does not deter entry, the low-cost 
incumbent’s  BCCL benefit is reduced by the profit loss of sharing the market with the entrant, i.e., 
                                                 









ent L F   . We analyze that extension of the model in section 4. 
14 Nonetheless, the above two conditions can be summarized as 
,,
,,
D NE D NE




D ED N E
e n tH e n tH  
 
since the high-cost incumbent is not affected by the capacity constraint —and therefore the 
expansion decision does not modify her production capacity in the second period— but 
,,
,,
D NE D E
ent L ent L  
 
given that the 
entrant’s duopoly profits decrease when the low-cost incumbent eliminates her capacity constraint. 




NE M NE D NE
L inc L inc L PLE q q  . At the end of section 3 we consider, instead, that the capacity constraint 
only affects her as a monopolist, yielding a profit loss due to entry of    
,,
,,
NE M NE D NE
L inc L inc L PLE q   . 8 
 
E
L LL BCC PLE BCC , whereas the high-cost incumbent only bears the profit loss due to entry, i.e., 
E
H PLE   <0. Note that expansion benefits when entry ensues, 
E
L L BCC PLE  , are only positive if 
,,
,, () 0
ED EM N E
L L inc L inc L BCC PLE q     . Intuitively, this condition holds when the low-cost incumbent is 








inc L  . This implies that her benefit 
from breaking the capacity constraint completely offsets the profit loss associated to entry, i.e., 
E
L L BCC PLE  . Finally, if despite not expanding entry occurs, the incumbent only experiences a profit 
loss due to entry of 
NE
K PLE   <0 for all K={H,L}.  
Single-Crossing Property. The single-crossing property is not necessarily satisfied under all 
conditions. In particular, if expansion deters entry, the low-cost incumbent obtains larger benefits from 
expanding her facility,  0 L BCC  , than the high-cost does, i.e., the latter obtains zero profits from 
breaking the capacity constraint. When expansion attracts entry, however, the benefits for the low-cost 
incumbent, 
E
L L BCC PLE  , are larger than for the high-cost type,  0
E
H PLE   , if and only if   
,, , ,
,, , , ()
D EM N E D E M E




i n cH i n cH    , the previous condition is 




inc L inc L q   .
16 From our previous discussion, this occurs when 
0
E
LL BCC PLE   which intuitively implies that the low-cost incumbent’s benefit from breaking her 
capacity constraint outweighs her profit loss from attracting entry.
17  
 
3. Equilibrium Analysis 
Before analyzing the set of Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE) of this signaling game, let us introduce 
some additional notation. In particular, let p
NE denote the probability that makes an entrant indifferent 
between the expected profits from Cournot competition after no expansion,
                                                 




inc L inc L q  
 
is a sufficient condition whereas 
,, , ,
,, , , ()
D EM N E D E M E
inc L inc L inc H inc H q    
 
is a necessary 




inc L inc L q  
 
is not satisfied, condition 
,, , ,
,, , , ()
D EM N E D E M E
inc L inc L inc H inc H q      can still hold if, for instance, the profit loss due to entry for the high-cost 
incumbent, 
E
H PLE , is relatively large. 
17 A similar argument would also be valid if the incumbent’s efficiency was drawn from a continuum of possible 
levels and not only from two levels, high and low, and if the incumbent were allowed to choose from a continuum of 
expansion investments. In general, when expansion is followed by entry, the low-cost incumbent does not 
necessarily obtain a larger benefit from marginally increasing her investment in comparison to a high-cost 
incumbent. 9 
 
   
,,
,, (1 )
DN E DN E
e n tH e n tL pF p F     and the profits from operating in the alternative market,
18 where 
superscript NE represents that the incumbent did not expand her facility. Similarly, let 
E p  denote the 
probability that makes the entrant indifferent between the expected profits from Cournot competition after 




ent H ent L pF pF     and the profits from operating in the alternative market, 
where superscript E represents that the incumbent expanded her facility.
19 It is easy to show that 
NEE p p  , intuitively indicating that entry can be sustained under a larger set of priors if the incumbent 
did not expand, for all 
NE p p  , than if she did, for all 
E p p  . Our description of equilibrium outcomes 
is separated into three regimes according to the priors: low,
NE p p  , intermediate, 
NEE p pp  , and 
high priors, 
E p p  . The following proposition identifies the set of PBE under the first regime.  
 
 
Proposition 1. When priors are relatively low,
NE p p  , the following strategy profiles can be 
supported as PBEs of the expansion signaling game: 
1.  A separating equilibrium where the incumbent chooses ( H NoExp , L Exp ), and the entrant selects        (
NoExp Enter , Exp NoEnter ) if and only if expansion costs satisfy KH>
E
H PLE  and KL<
E
L L BCC PLE   and 
the entrant’s beliefs are  (| )1 HN o E x p    and  (| )0 HE x p   ; 
2.  A pooling equilibrium with expansion, ( H Exp , L Exp ), and the entrant selects ( NoExp Enter , Exp NoEnter ) 
if and only if expansion costs satisfy
NE
L LL K BCC PLE   and KH<
E
H PLE  and the entrant’s beliefs 
are  (| )
E H Exp p p     and  (| )
NE H NoExp p   ; 
3.  A pooling PBE where both types of incumbent do not expand their facility ( H NoExp , L NoExp ) 
followed by no entry, where either: 
a)  the entrant’s strategy is  , NoExp Exp NoEnter Enter  given that her off-the-equilibrium beliefs are 
(| )
E H Exp p   , for expansion costs satisfying 
E
L LL K BCC PLE   and KH>0; or 
b)  the entrant’s strategy is   , NoExp Exp NoEnter NoEnter  given that her off-the-equilibrium beliefs are 
(| )
E H Exp p   , for expansion costs satisfying KL>BCCL and KH>0. 
 
The following figure depicts the set of expansion costs (KH, KL) under which each of the above PBEs can 
be sustained. First, when the low-cost expansion costs are relatively low, KL<
E
L L BCC PLE   , but those of 
                                                 
18 Recall that the entrant obtains zero profits on the alternative perfectly competitive market where information is 
readily available to any potential entrants. 
19 The expressions for p
NE and p
E are obtained by solving for p in these indifference conditions. They are both 
included in the appendix. We show that    ,0 , 1
EN E pp , and that these expressions satisfy 
NE E pp  under all 
parameter values. 10 
 
the high-cost incumbent are relatively high, i.e., KH>
E
H PLE , the former expands her facility while the 
latter does not. Under these expansion costs, hence, information about the incumbent’s cost structure is 
perfectly transmitted to the entrant, deterring her from entering after observing an expansion. Despite the 
information transmission, however, note that the incumbent’s expansion decision can be supported under 
different parameter conditions than under complete information. Specifically, if the entrant is perfectly 
informed about the incumbent’s costs being low, he is deterred, and hence the low-cost incumbent 
expands if expansion costs satisfy KL< L BCC , i.e., if expansion costs are lower than the only benefit from 
expansion under complete information embodied in  L BCC . In contrast, the high-cost incumbent does not 
expand since entry ensues and such expansion does not bring any direct benefit. Hence, under complete 
information the low (high)-cost incumbent expands (does not expand) if KL> L BCC and for any KH>0. 
Therefore, the entrant’s lack of information about the incumbent’s type induces the low-cost incumbent to 
expand her facility under a larger set of expansion costs, KL<
E
L L BCC PLE  , than in the complete 
information setting, KL< L BCC , since 
E
L L BCC PLE  < L BCC . Intuitively, the low-cost incumbent is 
willing to incur larger expansion costs in order to convey her type to the entrant, thus deterring entry. As a 
consequence, an increase in the profit loss associated to entry induces the incumbent to expand under 
higher expansion costs, ultimately enlarging the wedge between the set of parameter values in which 
expansion is profitable under complete information and those for which expansion is sustained under 
incomplete information. 
 
Figure 1: Equilibrium predictions under low priors. 11 
 
The figure also depicts a pooling equilibrium (described in part 2 of the Proposition 1) whereby 
both types of incumbent expand their facility given that expansion costs are relatively low, i.e., KL<
NE
L L BCC PLE    and K H<
E
H PLE . By expanding, incumbents successfully deter entry, which occurs 
because prior probability p is sufficiently low. Hence, the high-cost incumbent expands if the profit loss 
she avoids by deterring entry is larger than her expansion costs, i.e., KH<
E
H PLE . On the other hand, the 
low-cost incumbent expands if her expansion cost is lower than the foregone benefits from expansion, 
which arise not only from the profit loss she avoids by deterring entry but also from the benefits she 
obtains by breaking the capacity constraint, i.e., KL<
NE
L L BCC PLE  .  
Finally, the pooling equilibrium described in part 3 of Proposition 1 examines the case where no 
type of incumbent expands given the high expansion costs and that the entrant is deterred after observing 
no expansion. This outcome is supported in both pooling equilibria described in parts 3a and 3b. These 
equilibria differ, however, in their off-the-equilibrium predictions. In particular, the equilibrium in part 3a 
considers that, after observing a deviation towards expansion, the entrant believes that the incumbent’s 
costs must be high. These off-the-equilibrium beliefs are, however, not very sensible and do not survive 
standard equilibrium refinements.
20 If, by contrast, the entrant believes that a deviation towards expansion 
proceeds from a low-cost incumbent, then he does not enter. In this setting, the incumbent is therefore 
protected from entry both after expanding and not expanding her facility. Hence, the monopolist expands 
if her benefits from breaking the capacity constraint (BCCL for the low-cost and zero for the high-cost 
incumbent) are larger than her corresponding expansion costs. 
Let us next analyze how an increase in the efficiency of the low-cost incumbent affects our 
equilibrium results. In particular, a reduction in cL reflects a more efficient low-cost incumbent.
21 In 
particular, a more efficient incumbent becomes more limited by her capacity constraint and, therefore, 
obtains a larger benefit from expanding her facility, i.e., BCCL raises. Note that the pooling equilibria 
described in Proposition 1 (part 3) —where the low-cost incumbent does not expand— are sustained 
under more restrictive parameter conditions as the low-cost incumbent becomes more efficient, i.e., the 
region corresponding to this equilibrium in figure 1 shrinks. Indeed, a larger efficiency increases her 
benefits from breaking the capacity constraint, BCCL, inducing her to expand under larger expansion 
costs. In contrast, an increase in the efficiency level of the low-cost incumbent expands the set of 
parameter values under which we can support the separating equilibrium and the pooling equilibrium 
                                                 
20 Appendix 1 shows that the deviation towards expansion is more likely to originate from the low- than from the 
high-cost incumbent. Therefore, the pooling equilibrium in part 3a violates the Cho and Kreps’ (1987) Intuitive 
Criterion under most parameter conditions. 
21 This implies that 
NE
LL BCC PLE    when the incumbent is not very efficient (cL is relatively high), but 
NE
LL BCC PLE   when her efficiency increases (cL is relatively low). 12 
 
where both types of incumbent expand their facility. Let us next examine equilibrium outcomes when 




Proposition 2.  When priors satisfy p
NE≤p<p
E, the strategy profiles described in parts 1 and 2 of 
Proposition 1 can  still be can be supported as PBEs of the expansion signaling game. In addition, a 
pooling equilibrium with no expansion can be sustained, ( H NoExp , L NoExp ), followed by entry (since 
priors satisfy (| )
NE H NoExp p p   ) if either of the following two cases arises: 
a)  The entrant’s strategy is  , NoExp Exp Enter NoEnter  given that her off-the-equilibrium beliefs are 
(| )
E H Exp p    and expansion costs satisfy  KL>
E
L L BCC PLE   and KH>
E
H PLE ; or 
b)  The entrant’s strategy is  , NoExp Exp Enter Enter given that her off-the-equilibrium beliefs are 
(| )
E H Exp p    and expansion costs satisfy KL>
NEE
L LL BCC PLE PLE  and KH>0. 
 




Figure 2: Equilibrium predictions under intermediate priors. 
 
Relative to the set of equilibria when priors are relatively low depicted in figure 1, two 
equilibrium outcomes can still be supported under intermediate priors: the (fully informative) separating 
                                                 
22 Note that the figure depicts the case where 
E NE
HL PLE PLE  . An analogous figure can be constructed otherwise. 13 
 
equilibrium and the pooling equilibrium where both types of incumbent expand their facility. 
Nonetheless, two pooling equilibria with no expansion emerge; as described in Proposition 2a and 2b.
23 
First, Proposition 2a specifies a pooling equilibrium similar to that in Proposition 1, part 3a. Unlike that 
equilibrium, however, the entrant is now attracted to the market after observing no expansion (in 
equilibrium) since priors are relatively higher, both in the equilibria described in Proposition 2a and 2b. 
First, if entry follows after no expansion but does not otherwise (as described in Proposition 2a), the high-
cost incumbent does not expand (as prescribed) if the benefit she would obtain from deterring entry —by 
deviating towards expansion— is lower than her expansion costs, i.e., KH>
E
H PLE . Similarly, the low-cost 
incumbent does not expand if the benefit she would obtain from expanding (not only arising from 
avoiding entry but also from breaking the capacity constraint) is lower than her expansion costs, i.e., KL>
E
L L BCC PLE  . If, in contrast, the entrant believes that a deviation towards expansion must originate 
from a high-cost incumbent, then entry follows regardless of the incumbent’s action (as described in 
Proposition 2b). These off-the-equilibrium beliefs, however, are not very sensible since the low-cost 
incumbent is more likely to deviate towards expansion than the high-cost incumbent, and indeed violate 
standard equilibrium refinements.
24 Let us finally examine our equilibrium predictions under relatively 
high priors, i.e., p≥p
E .  
 
Proposition 3.  When priors satisfy  p≥p
E,  only the separating strategy profile described in 
Proposition 1 (part 1), and the pooling strategy profiles with no expansion specified in Proposition 2a 
and 2b can be can be supported as PBEs of the expansion signaling game. 
 
  Therefore, the pooling equilibrium where both types of incumbent expand cannot be sustained 
when priors are relatively high. Intuitively, the expansion decision by both types of incumbent keeps the 
entrant “in the dark” about the incumbent’s cost structure and entry is deterred when priors satisfy p<p
E. 
When priors are relatively high p≥p
E, however, this strategy would attract entry, leading the incumbent to 
not use it. All other equilibrium outcomes can still be sustained in this context. 
 
Not severe capacity constraints. In our previous analysis, we consider that the low-cost incumbent is 
severely limited by her capacity constraint. In particular, when she does not expand her facility she faces 
                                                 
23 In addition, Appendix 2 shows that, under relatively general conditions, a semiseparating equilibrium can be 
sustained, whereby one or both types of incumbent randomize their expansion decision. 
24 Appendix 1 shows that the pooling equilibrium described in Proposition 2b violates the Cho and Kreps’ (1987) 
Intuitive Criterion for all expansion costs lower than the benefits that the low-cost incumbent obtains from breaking 
her capacity constraint and protecting the market, i.e.,  
E
LL L KB C CP L E  14 
 








inc L q  , 
respectively. Therefore, the profit loss due to entry, when the low-cost incumbent is severely limited by 
her capacity constraint was defined as 
,,
,, () ()
NE M NE D NE
L inc L inc L PLE q q  . If, however, the capacity constraint 
affects the incumbent only as a monopolist, then the profit loss can be expressed as 
,,
,, ()
M NE D NE
inc K inc K q   . 








inc K   , the profit loss is more 
substantial when the incumbent is severely limited by the capacity constraint than otherwise. Let us 
evaluate the consequences of a less severe capacity constraint in our equilibrium results. Importantly, our 
above discussion shows that only the profit loss from entry is reduced.
25 When priors are relatively low, 
this implies that the set of parameter values supporting the pooling equilibrium with expansion (described 
in Proposition 1, part 2) shrinks. Intuitively, the low-cost incumbent obtains a smaller benefit from 
deterring entry, and therefore expands only under cheaper expansion costs. When priors are intermediate 
or high, a relaxation in the capacity constraint also produces a larger set of expansion costs sustaining the 
pooling equilibrium in which both types of incumbent do not expand; as described in Proposition 2b. 
 
Remark.  For simplicity, we focus on the set of pure-strategy PBEs. Appendix 2 elaborates on the 
properties of equilibria in which either one type of incumbent (or both) randomize their expansion 
decision, i.e., semiseparating equilibria. Intuitively, this appendix shows that when priors are low, 
semiseparating equilibria can be sustained under parameter conditions for which pure-strategy PBE 
already exists. When priors are relatively higher, however, semiseparating equilibria can be supported for 
regions of expansion costs where no equilibrium could be sustained when firms are restricted to use pure 
strategies. These semiseparating equilibria, nonetheless, predict that the low-cost incumbent does not 
necessarily expand her facility with a higher probability than the high-cost incumbent, thus limiting the 
informative role of the incumbent’s expansion decision. Importantly, these equilibria can be sustained 
when both types of incumbent face relatively low expansion costs. Therefore, a policy that lowers 
expansion costs for both types of incumbent —which occurs, for instance, if government agencies cannot 
observe the incumbent’s costs— can potentially promote this type of semiseparating equilibria, whereby 




                                                 
25 In particular, allowing for the low-cost incumbent to be unaffected by her capacity constraint under duopoly only 
lowers 
NE
L PLE but does not affect  L BCC , 
NE
H PLE  or 
E
K PLE , for all    , KH L  . 15 
 
4. Extensions 
In this section we consider different extensions of our model. First, we show that a similar information 
transmission can be sustained when the incumbent’s constraint arises from a significant market demand 
rather than from her efficiency level considered above. Furthermore, note that our model does not allow 
for expansion to serve as an entry deterrence tool, but merely as a device to convey the incumbent’s cost-
structure to the entrant and thus deter him from the market. Indeed, our previous assumptions consider 
that the entrant enters (stays out) when the incumbent’s costs are high (low, respectively), regardless of 
her expansion decision. In our second extension we investigate how our equilibrium results are affected if 
the low-cost incumbent experiences entry when she does not expand, but deters it otherwise.     
 
Market demand as a capacity constraint. Consider an analogous signaling model where the 
incumbent’s production costs are common knowledge but market demand is only observed by the 
incumbent. The entrant, however, only knows the prior probability that demand is high or low. Similarly 
as in our previous model, the incumbent decides whether to expand her facility, and the entrant, observing 
the incumbent’s decision, chooses to enter the market. In this case, the incumbent experiences a capacity 
constraint when demand is high, but does not when demand is low.
26 The entrant prefers to enter the 




H inc H inc H BCC q    denote the 





K inc K inc K PLE    represent the profit loss due to entry that the incumbent suffers 
after expanding her facility, while 
,,
,, () () 0
NE M NE D NE
Ki n c K i n c K PLE q q     denote the profit loss after no 
expansion, for any demand level    , KH L  . The following result shows that the strategy profiles 
specified in propositions 1-3 can also be supported in this information context by switching the type of 
incumbent who experiences a capacity constraint: from the low-cost incumbent in the previous setting to 
the high-demand incumbent in this environment. Hence, regions of expansion costs (KH, KL) sustaining 
every equilibrium are switched, from the low-cost (high-cost) incumbent to the high-demand (low-
demand) incumbent, respectively. For instance, the separating equilibrium where only the constrained 
high-demand incumbent expands can be supported if 
E
HH H K BCC PLE   and 
E
L L K PLE  . 
 
                                                 
26 Similarly as in our previous model, each capacity constraint  q  can be interpreted as a maximum production 
level that the high-demand incumbent cannot exceed, but also as an increase in the incumbent’s marginal costs of 
production when her output exceeds  q , as in Dixit (1980).   16 
 
Proposition 4. In the expansion signaling game where the potential entrant does not observe 
market demand, the separating and pooling strategy profiles described in Propositions 1-3 can be 
sustained as PBEs, where the regions of expansion costs supporting each equilibrium are switched across 
the two types of incumbent, from the low-cost (high-cost) incumbent to the high-demand (low-demand) 
incumbent, respectively.    
 
Thus, our results in the previous section can be extended to different information contexts where 
the incumbent suffering a capacity constraint conveys her type to the entrant in the separating equilibrium 
of the game regardless of the source of such constraint. A similar intuition is applicable to the pooling 
equilibria, whereby the incumbent’s actions conceal whether or not she faces a capacity constraint. 
 
Expansion is not only an informative signal. Let us finally extend our model to the case where the 
expansion decision can serve as an entry deterrence device, even under complete information. Similar to 
our previous assumptions, the high-cost incumbent’s capacity does not affect the entrant’s decision, since 
he enters both after observing expansion and no expansion. Unlike our initial setting, however, we 









ent L F   , i.e., 
,,
,,
D NE D E
ent L ent L F   . Under these 
assumptions, the low-cost incumbent not only needs to convey her type to the entrant, but must also 
expand if she seeks to deter entry.
27 This result is confirmed in the following corollary. 
 
Corollary 1. In the expansion signaling game where the entrant is uninformed about the incumbent’s 
cost structure and 
,,
,,
D NE D E
ent L ent L F   , all PBEs described in Propositions 1-3 can be sustained, except for 
the pooling equilibria with no expansion (followed by no entry) specified in Proposition 1 (part 3).    
 
Intuitively, the low-cost incumbent faces an additional incentive to expand, relative to our previous 
model: not only she must convey her type to the potential entrant if she wants to deter entry, but she must 
also expand her facility, i.e., 
,,
,,
D NE D E
ent L ent L F   . This explains why the pooling equilibrium with no 




                                                 
27 Note that in a complete information setting these incentives resemble those in Dixit (1980). 17 
 
5. Discussion and policy implications 
Let us next evaluate the welfare properties of the above equilibria.  In the separating equilibrium, entry 
occurs in high-demand markets, but it is deterred in low-demand markets. This implies that the entry 
pattern described in the separating equilibrium of the game coincides with that arising under complete 
information.
28 If, instead, the entrant entered into low-demand markets, his overall profits (net of entry 
costs) would be negative, inducing the entrant to fail in the long run and exit the industry. In contrast, 
entry in the pooling equilibria does not ensue in similar conditions as under complete information, since it 
might occur (not occur) when entry is not (is, respectively) profitable given the entrant’s lack of accurate 
information. For instance, entry follows in the pooling equilibrium even when demand is low if priors are 
sufficiently high, whereas entry does not occur despite demand being actually high when priors are 
sufficiently low. A similar argument can be extended to the context where the entrant is uninformed about 
the incumbent’s efficiency level. 
Our discussion suggests that public agencies should promote separating equilibria in order to 
support more desirable entry profiles. We can examine under which conditions this type of equilibrium 
occurs and what policies can facilitate it. The separating equilibrium can be sustained if the expansion 
costs that the constrained incumbent faces are significantly lower than those of the unconstrained 
incumbent. Such difference in expansion costs can arise if, for instance, constrained incumbents —either 
very efficient firms or incumbents operating in high-demand markets— accumulate profits before their 
expansion decision. Hence, a constrained incumbent could self-finance a larger portion of her expansion 
than the unconstrained incumbent, thus not having to access capital markets to the same extent as the 
unconstrained firm. In this case, no government intervention is necessary since, from our previous 
discussion, entry patterns in the separating equilibrium are similar to those under complete information.  
If, however, financial institutions are unable to differentiate among both types of incumbent, 
firms face similar expansion costs. In such case, our results suggest socially improving policies. 
Specifically, if expansion costs are symmetric and relatively high, a policy reducing expansion costs can 
induce a change in incumbents’ expansion decision, from a pooling equilibrium where no type of 
incumbent expands (producing undesirable entry patterns) to a separating equilibrium where only the 
constrained incumbent expands (generating desirable entry). The following figure illustrates the effect of 
this policy, as a reduction in the symmetric expansion costs (those along the diagonal KH=KL) from point 
A to B.
29 Importantly, note that a policy radically reducing firms’ expansion costs might produce 
undesirable outcomes; as depicted by point C in the figure. In particular, expansion costs are so 
                                                 
28 A similar argument is applicable to the case in which the entrant is uninformed about the incumbent’s efficiency. 
29 For simplicity, the figure considers p<p
NE. Analogous figures can be applied to different prior probabilities. 18 
 
significantly reduced at C that both types of incumbent choose to expand their facility, hindering the 
ability of expansion decisions to serve as an informative signal for potential entrants. 
 
Figure 3: Effects of a policy reducing expansion costs. 
 
Note that our previous result is applicable under all prior probabilities. When priors are relatively 
low, a symmetric decrease in expansion costs moves the outcome towards the pooling equilibrium where 
both types of incumbent expand and entry does not ensue. When priors are intermediate and high, such 
symmetric reduction in expansion costs moves equilibrium outcomes towards a semiseparating 
equilibrium where the low-cost incumbent does not necessarily expand with a larger probability than the 
high-cost incumbent, as suggested in section 3. Hence, policies reducing expansion costs do not 
necessarily induce desirable entry patterns.  
In order to promote the separating equilibrium, our model suggests that government agencies 
should increase the benefits that firms experience when breaking their capacity constraint, e.g., 
subsidizing their production costs. Such policies, rather than a reduction of firms’ fixed costs from 
expansion, can expand the set of parameter values under which the separating equilibrium arises in our 
model. Examples about this type of policies abound. Germany and Spain, for instance, were among the 
first countries to implement subsidies reducing the marginal production cost of firms installing solar cell 
panels.
30 In our model, such a subsidy would increase the constrained incumbent’s post-entry profits, 
                                                 
30 As documented in The Economist, on December 9
th 2010. 19 
 
thereby increasing L BCC more significantly than 
E
K PLE , ultimately enlarging the set of parameter values 
supporting the separating equilibrium. A similar argument can be applied for utility discount programs, 
such as the “Power for Jobs” program in New York State, which also reduces marginal production costs.
31 
Finally, note that the reduction of symmetric expansion costs promotes the separating equilibrium 
only if 
EE
L LH BCC PLE PLE . Intuitively, this occurs when the incumbent’s benefit from breaking her 
capacity constraint is significant, e.g., the capacity constraint is severe. Otherwise, a policy that reduces 
expansion costs for both types of incumbents only switches the pooling equilibrium being played, from 
one where no type of incumbent expands to that in which both types expand.
32 In line with our above 
discussion, in these contexts a policy reducing marginal production costs might be more appropriate than 
a subsidy in expansion costs. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper examines entry deterrence and signaling in a context where the incumbent experiences a 
capacity constraint. We demonstrate that separating and pooling equilibria can be sustained and that most 
of them survive standard equilibrium refinements. Our results suggest that severe capacity constraints 
expand the set of parameter values that support the fully-informative separating equilibrium. Otherwise, 
this set shrinks, leading to an expansion of the set sustaining pooling equilibria. Furthermore, we showed 
that if financial institutions discriminate constrained and unconstrained incumbents, and the financial 
costs that these two types of incumbent face when choosing to expand their facility are substantially 
different, the separating equilibrium can be supported under large parameter values. In this case, 
information about the incumbent’s cost structure (or market demand) is perfectly transmitted to the 
entrant, and entry patterns are desirable, calling for no government intervention. If, in contrast, both types 
of incumbent face similar expansion costs and the capacity constraint is severe, we identify a policy that 
can help move the industry towards the separating equilibrium (with similar entry patterns to those under 
complete information), namely, a reduction in expansion costs. Nonetheless, our results also show that 
this policy should not be overemphasized. Otherwise, such policy would leave undesirable entry patterns 
unaffected. 
Our model offers several extensions for further research. First, the paper considers that the 
incumbent can only choose one specific investment level in order to expand her facility, which is 
sufficiently large to eliminate her capacity constraint. In richer settings, however, the incumbent might 
                                                 
31 However, note that in order to guarantee that the entrant stays out of the market where the efficient incumbent 
operates the above policy might have to be accompanied by an increase in the administrative costs of entry, F. 
32 Graphically, this implies that cutoff 
E
LL BCC PLE    crosses cutoff 
E
H PLE  above the diagonal KH=KL.. 20 
 
choose among a continuum of investment levels, each of them yielding a different capacity.
33 Second, we 
consider that potential entrants only observe the incumbent’s expansion decision, but are not able to 
observe the incumbent’s output. In some industries, nonetheless, the entrant might observe both 
incumbent’s actions. Entry patterns can hence be different to those in signaling games where the entrant 
either observes the incumbent’s output alone —as in Milgrom and Roberts (1982)— or her expansion 
decision alone —as in this paper. Specifically, this is due to the fact that the incumbent’s expansion 
decision breaks her capacity constraint in the second period but not in the first. Hence, a constrained 
incumbent in this setting would not be able to increase her first-period production level beyond q  in 
order to convey her efficiency level to the potential entrant, hampering the role of output as an 
informative signal. Hence, the introduction of an additional signal, rather than improving information 
transmission to the entrant, could potentially limit the dissemination of information. 
 
  
                                                 
33 Both separating and pooling equilibria might still emerge in this context, since when expansion is followed by 
entry, the constrained incumbent does not necessarily obtain a larger benefit from marginally increasing her 
investment than the unconstrained incumbent does, as suggested in our discussion of the single-crossing property. 21 
 
APPENDIX 
Appendix 1 - Equilibrium refinement 
Proposition A. All equilibria identified in Propositions 1 and 2 survive the Cho and Kreps’ (1987) Intuitive 
Criterion, except for: 
 
1.  the pooling equilibrium of no expansion followed by  , NoExp Exp NoEnter Enter      as described in 
Proposition 1(part 3a), if expansion costs satisfy 
E
L LL L BCC K BCC PLE   and  0 H K  ; 
2.  the pooling equilibrium of no expansion followed by  , NoExp Exp NoEnter NoEnter     as described in 
Proposition 1(part 3b), if expansion costs satisfy 
NE
L LL L BCC PLE K BCC   and  0
NE
HH PLE K  ; 
3.  the pooling equilibrium of no expansion followed by  , NoExp Exp Enter Enter     as described in Proposition 
2b, if expansion costs satisfy 
EN E E
L LL L L L BCC PLE K BCC PLE PLE   and  0
NE
HH PLE K  ; 
and if expansion costs satisfy 
EN E E
L LL L L L BCC PLE K BCC PLE PLE    and 
NE




Pooling equilibrium (Proposition 2b): If the high-cost incumbent deviates towards expansion, the highest payoff 












inc H inc H H K   , and since 
,,
,,
M EM N E
inc H inc H    this condition implies 
,,
,,
NE M NE D NE
H inc H inc H H PLE K   . Hence, 
considering the equilibrium condition for the high-cost incumbent ( 0 H K  ), she deviates towards expansion if and 
only if  0
NE
HH PLE K  . Similarly, if the low-cost incumbent deviates towards expansion, the highest payoff she 








inc L   if and only if   
,,
,, ()
M ED N E E
Li n c Li n c L L L Kq B C C P L E     . Considering the equilibrium condition for the low-cost incumbent 
(KL>BCCL), she deviates towards expansion if and only if 
NEE E
L LL L L L BCC PLE PLE K BCC PLE     . 
Hence, the following cases can arise: 
  If 
NEE E
L LL L L L BCC PLE PLE K BCC PLE      and 0
NE
HH K PLE   for the low-cost and high-cost 
incumbent, respectively, then both types of incumbent deviate towards expansion. Then the entrant’s off-the-
equilibrium beliefs are updated to  (| ) H Exp p    , where 
NEE p pp   , leading the entrant to stay out after 
observing this expansion. But then both types of incumbent have incentives to deviate towards expansion, and 
the pooling equilibrium without expansion violates the Intuitive Criterion for all 
NEE E
L LL L L L BCC PLE PLE K BCC PLE      and 0
NE
HH K PLE  and intermediate priors 
NEE p pp  . If, instead, priors are relatively high, 
E p p  , the entrant enters after observing the deviation 









inc H   , since 
,,
,,
D ED N E
inc H inc H   . 












D E D NE NE E
L inc L inc L L L L K q BCC PLE PLE       , which holds in this pooling equilibrium. Therefore, no 
type of incumbent deviates and the pooling equilibrium without expansion of Proposition 2b survives the 
Intuitive Criterion for all 
NEE E
L LL L L L BCC PLE PLE K BCC PLE      and 0
NE
HH K PLE  and priors 
are relatively high, i.e., 
E p p  . 22 
 
  If 
NE
HH K PLE   but 
NEE E
L LL L L L BCC PLE PLE K BCC PLE     , then the high-cost incumbent does not 
deviate towards expansion, but the low-costs incumbent does deviate. The entrant’s off-the-equilibrium beliefs 
(after observing a expansion) become  (| )0 HE x p   , whereas his beliefs after observing no expansion are  
 (| )  0 , 1 HN o E x p p   . Since p>p
NE holds in this equilibrium, the entrant does not enter after observing 
expansion, but enters otherwise, i.e.,  exp exp , no NoEnter Enter   . Given this response by the entrant after updating 




i n cH i n cH H qK    or 
NE
HH K PLE  , which is satisfied in the case we consider. However, the low-cost 




inc L inc L L qK   , or 
,,
,, 0( )
M ED N E E
L inc L inc L L L Kq B C C P L E      . 
Considering, in addition, this incumbent’s equilibrium conditions (
NE E
L LL L BCC PLE PLE K   ), the above 
condition becomes 
E
L LL L BCC K BCC PLE   , which indeed holds in the case we consider. As a 
consequence, the low-cost incumbent deviates towards expansion. Hence, the pooling equilibrium (NoExpH, 
NoExpL) with (EnterNoExp, EnterExp), as described in Proposition 2b, violates the Intuitive Criterion when 
expansion costs satisfy
NE
HH K PLE   and 
NEE E
L LL L L L BCC PLE PLE K BCC PLE     . 
  If 
NE
L LL K BCC PLE   and 
NE
HH K PLE  , then no incumbent deviates towards expansion. This implies that 
the entrant does not update his beliefs and therefore he responds by using the prescribed strategy (EnterEXP, 
EnterNEXP). Hence, the pooling (NoExpH;NoExpL) with (EnterEXP; EnterNEXP) survives the Intuitive Criterion. 
  If 
NE
L LL K BCC PLE   but 0
NE
HH K PLE  , then the low-cost incumbent does not deviate towards 
expansion, but the high-cost incumbent does deviate. The entrant’s off-the-equilibrium beliefs become 
(| )1 HE x p   ,  whereas his beliefs after observing no expansion (in equilibrium) are   
 (| )  0 , 1 HN o E x p p   . Since p>p
NE holds in this equilibrium, the entrant enters after observing 
expansion, and also enters after observing no expansion, i.e.,  , Exp NoExp Enter Enter     . Hence, the entrant’s 
strategy coincides with that in equilibrium, and therefore both types of incumbent’s equilibrium strategy are 
unaffected. Thus, this pooling equilibrium survives the Intuitive Criterion under expansion costs 
NE
L LL K BCC PLE   and 0
NE
HH K PLE  . 
 
Pooling equilibrium (Proposition 1, Part 3a): If the low-cost incumbent deviates towards expansion the highest 












Li n c Li n c L L KB C C    . Combining this condition with the parameter values under which this equilibrium is 
supported (
E
L LL K BCC PLE  ), we obtain that the low-cost incumbent deviates towards expansion if 
E
L LL L BCC K BCC PLE   . Similarly, if the high-cost incumbent deviates towards expansion, the highest 













M EM N E




inc H inc H H K    . As consequence, the high-cost incumbent does not deviate 
under any parameter values. The following two cases can hence arise:  
  If 
E
L LL L BCC K BCC PLE   only the low-cost incumbent has incentives to deviate towards expansion, 
which helps the entrant restrict his off-the-equilibrium beliefs to  (| )0 HE x p   . These beliefs induce no 
entry after observing expansion (and no entry after expansion either since  (| )
NE H NoExp p p   in this 
equilibrium), i.e.,  , NoExp Exp NoEnter NoEnter   . Given this strategy for the entrant, the low-cost incumbent 








inc L q  given that  L L K BCC  holds in this case. In contrast, 23 
 




inc H  for all KH>0. 
Therefore, only the low-cost incumbent deviates towards expansion, and the pooling PBE where (NoExpH, 
NoExpL) with (NEnterNoExp, EnterExp), as described in Proposition 1, Part 3a, violates the Intuitive Criterion if 
expansion costs satisfy
E
L LL L BCC K BCC PLE   and KH>0. 
  If, instead, 
E
L LL L K BCC BCC PLE  , then no type of incumbent has incentives to deviate towards no 
expansion. Hence, the entrant’s beliefs are unaffected, his strategy still coincides with that in the pooling 
equilibrium, i.e.,  , NoExp Exp NEnter Enter   , and this pooling equilibrium survives the Intuitive Criterion. 
 
Pooling equilibrium (Proposition 2a): If the low-cost incumbent deviates towards expansion the highest payoff she 








inc L q   if and only if   
,,
,, ()
M ED N E E
Li n c Li n c L L L Kq B C C P L E     . This inequality, however, contradicts the parameter condition for the 
low-cost incumbent supporting this pooling PBE. As a consequence, she does not deviate towards expansion. 




inc H H K   , 




inc H   if and only if 
,,
,,
M ED N E E
H inc H inc H H KP L E  . This 
inequality also contradicts the parameter condition for the high-cost incumbent supporting this pooling PBE. 
Therefore, she does not deviate towards expansion either. Hence, no type of incumbent has incentives to deviate 
towards expansion, and the pooling equilibrium (NoExpH, NoExpL) with (ENEXP; NEEXP) survives the Intuitive 
Criterion. 
 
Pooling equilibrium (Proposition 1b): If the low-cost incumbent deviates towards expansion the highest payoff she 












L inc L inc L L Kq B C C    . This inequality, however, contradicts the parameter condition for the high-cost 
incumbent supporting this pooling PBE (KL>BCCL). As a consequence, she does not deviate towards expansion. 




inc H H K   , 




inc H q  for any KH>0. Therefore, the high-cost incumbent does 
not deviate towards expansion either, and the pooling equilibrium (NoExpH, NoExpL) with (NoEntryNEXP; 
NoEntryEXP) survives the Intuitive Criterion. 
 
Pooling equilibrium (Proposition 1, Part 3b):  If the high-cost incumbent deviates towards no expansion, the 





















Hi n c Hi n c H K    . Considering the equilibrium condition for the high-cost 
incumbent (KH<
NE
H PLE ), this implies that she deviates towards no expansion if and only if 0
NE
HH K PLE  . 












L inc L inc L L Kq B C C    . Considering the equilibrium condition for the low-cost incumbent (
NE
L LL K BCC PLE  ), she deviates towards no expansion if and only if 
NE
L LL L BCC K BCC PLE   . Hence, 
the following cases can arise: 
  If 
NE
L LL L BCC K BCC PLE    and 0
NE
HH K PLE  , then both incumbents deviate towards no expansion, 
and the entrant’s off-the-equilibrium beliefs become     | HN o E x p p   , where  
NE p p   (the pooling 
equilibrium of Proposition 1, part 3b holds only for relatively low priors). The entrant hence stays out after 
observing a deviation towards no expansion. Therefore, both types of incumbents have incentives to deviate 

















L inc L inc L L Kq B C C   
 




inc H H K  24 
 
conditions on the expansion costs of the low and high-cost incumbent are satisfied, both types of incumbent 
deviate towards no expansion, and the pooling equilibrium with expansion of Proposition 1 (part 3b) violates the 
Intuitive Criterion for all:  
NE
L LL L BCC K BCC PLE    and 0
NE
HH K PLE  . 
  If, instead, 
NE
L LL L K BCC BCC PLE   but 0
NE
HH K PLE  , then the low-cost incumbent does not 
deviate towards no expansion, while the high-cost incumbent does deviate. The entrant’s off-the-equilibrium 
beliefs become  (| )1 HN E x p   , whereas his beliefs after observing expansion are     (| )    0 , 1 HE x p p   . 
Since in this equilibrium priors satisfy
E p p   , the entrant stays out after observing expansion but enters after 
observing no expansion, i.e., (NoEnterExp,EnterNExp). The optimal response by the entrant after updating his 
beliefs, however, coincides with his response in this pooling equilibrium. As a consequence, the incumbent’s 
expansion decision is unaffected, and we can conclude that this pooling equilibrium survives the Intuitive 
Criterion if expansion costs satisfy 
NE
L LL L K BCC BCC PLE   and 0
NE
HH K PLE  . 
 
 
Appendix 2 – Semiseparating equilibria 
 
Proposition B. The following strategy profiles can be supported as semi-separating PBEs of the game: 
1.  A strategy profile where the incumbent expands her facility when her costs are low, pL=1, but expands with 












In this equilibrium, after observing 








 , given beliefs  (| )1 HN o E x p    and  (| )
E H Exp p   . This equilibrium can be only 
supported if priors are relatively high, p>p
E, and expansion costs satisfy   
1 0m i n ,
E









   and  
EN E E
HL L L B PLE BCC PLE PLE      . 
2.  A strategy profile where the incumbent expands her facility when her costs are high, pH=1, but expands with 












In this equilibrium, after observing 








 , given beliefs  (| )0 HN o E x p    and  (| )
E H Exp p   . This equilibrium can be only 
supported if priors are relatively high, p>p
E, and expansion costs satisfy 
E
L L K PLE  . 























, where  ,( 0 , 1 ) HL pp 
 
After observing 





















       25 
 
given beliefs  (| )
NE H NoExp p    and  (| )
E H Exp p   . This equilibrium can be only supported if priors 
are intermediate,
















   if
NEE






  otherwise if 
NEE
L L PLE PLE  , where  
EN E E





H LL CP L EK B C C  . 
4.  A strategy profile where the incumbent does not expand her facility when her costs are high, pH=0, but expands 










In this equilibrium, after 







, given beliefs  (| )0 HE x p    and  (| )
NE H NoExp p   . This equilibrium 
can be only supported if priors are relatively low, p<p
NE, and expansion costs satisfy 
E
E L
LL L HL E
H
PLE
PLE BCC K K BCC
PLE
  . 
5.  A strategy profile where the incumbent does not expand her facility when her costs are low, pL=0, but expands 









In this equilibrium, after 







 , given beliefs  (| )1 HE x p    and  (| )
NE H NoExp p   . This equilibrium can be 
only supported for priors , p>p













pL=1 and pHא(0,1).  In this equilibrium, the entrant’s beliefs after observing no expansion become 




ent H F   . In the case that the entrant observes expansion, he 
mixes if his beliefs  (| ) H Exp 
 
satisfy 
   
,,
,, (| ) ( 1 (| ) ) 0
DE DE
e n tH e n tL HE x p F HE x p F          










ent L ent H
F







. We can now use the entrant’s 
posterior beliefs  (| )
E H Exp p   in order to find the probability, pH,  with which the high-cost incumbent 

























, where    0,1 H p 
 
for all 
E p p  . In addition, note that pH is 
















  and converging to 
1 lim 0 H p p
  .  
Regarding the incumbent, when her costs are high, she mixes as prescribed,    0,1 H p  , if and only if 
 
    
,, ,
,, , 1
D EM E D N E
inc H H inc H H inc H rK r K        ,  







i n cH i n cH H
ME DE













H i n cH i n cH PLE  and
,,
,,
D ED N E







 , where 
  0,1 r  only if expansion costs satisfy 
E
HH K PLE  . On the other hand, the low-cost incumbent expands as 
prescribed (pL=1) if and only if 
 
     
,, ,
,, , 1
D EM E D N E








ME DN E NE
inc L inc L L LL L
ME DE E
inc L inc L L























HL L L B PLE BCC PLE PLE     . Hence, this semiseparating strategy profile can be supported as an 
equilibrium if expansion costs satisfy   
1 0m i n ,
E
HH H KP L E K   and priors are relatively high, i.e.
 
E p p  . 
 
pH=1 and pLא(0,1).  In this equilibrium, the entrant’s posterior beliefs after observing no expansion are 




ent L F   . In the case that the entrant observes expansion, 
he mixes if his beliefs  (| ) H Exp 
 
satisfy 
   
,,
,, (| ) ( 1 (| ) ) 0
DE DE
e n tH e n tL HE x p F HE x p F          
and solving for  (| ) H Exp  , we obtain
 
(| )






















, where    0,1 L p 
 
for all 
E p p  . In addition, pL is increasing 














 , starts at 
0 lim 0 L p p






Regarding the incumbent, when her costs are high, she expands as prescribed (pH=1) if and only if
      
,, ,
,, , 1
D EM E M N E
inc H H inc H H inc H rK r K        ,  
solving for r, and using the property that 
,,
,,
M NE M E















where cutoff  0 r    for all parameter values. On the other hand, the low-cost incumbent randomizes as prescribed, 
  0,1 L p  , if and only if 
 
     
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,, , 1
D EM E D E









inc L inc L L L
M ED E E










where    0,1 r  if 
E
L L K PLE  . Finally, since cutoff  0 r   ,  rr   under all parameter values. Hence, this 
semiseparating strategy profile can be supported as an equilibrium if expansion costs satisfy 
E
L L K PLE  for low 
and intermediate priors, i.e.,
 
E p p  .  
 
pL, pHא(0,1). In this equilibrium, after observing an expansion, the entrant is indifferent between entering and not 
entering the incumbent’s market if and only if his posterior beliefs  (| ) H Exp   satisfy 
   
,,
,, (| ) ( 1 (| ) ) 0
DE DE
e n tH e n tL HE x p F HE x p F        
  










ent L ent H
F







. We can then use the entrant’s 
posterior beliefs  (| )
E H Exp p   in order to find probability, pH, with which the incumbent randomizes when her 














Solving for pH we obtain 
 











. Similarly, after observing that the incumbent does not 
expand, the entrant is indifferent between entering and not entering the incumbent’s market if and only if his 
posterior beliefs  (| ) H NoExp   satisfy 
   
,,
,, (| ) ( 1 (| ) ) 0
DN E DN E
ent H ent L HN o E x p F HN o E x p F       
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. We can hence use the entrant’s 
posterior beliefs  (| )
NE H NoExp p   in order to find probability, pL, with which the incumbent randomizes when 














   
 











. Solving for pH and pL simultaneously, we 






















 . First, note that  0 L p  if and only if 
NE p p  , 
given that 
EN E p p   and   ,, 0 , 1
EN E pp p   under all parameter values. In addition,  1 L p   for all 
E p p  . 28 
 
Therefore,    0,1 L p   if and only if priors are intermediate, i.e., 
NEE p pp  . Second, note that  0 H p  if and 
only if 
NE p p  . Furthermore,  1 H p   for all 
E p p  . Therefore,    0,1 H p   only if priors are intermediate, i.e., 
NEE p pp  . We can therefore conclude that under intermediate priors both types of incumbent randomize their 
expansion decisions,    ,0 , 1 HL pp  , where note that  H L p p   for all 
E p p  , which holds in this regime of 


























Finally, note that at the lower bound of   ,













Let us now examine the incumbent’s strategy in this equilibrium. If the high-cost incumbent expands with 
probability   0,1 H p  , as prescribed, it must be that the entrant makes her indifferent between expanding and not 
expanding her facility,  
       
,, , ,
,, , , 11
D EM E D N E M N E
inc H H inc H H inc H inc H rK r K s s             ,  
where  r and s are the probability with which the entrant enters after observing expansion and no expansion, 







ME MN E MN E DN E
inc H inc H H inc H inc H
ME DE ME DE











M EM N E
inc H inc H   and
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,,
D ED N E









Similarly, when the incumbent’s costs are low, the entrant makes the incumbent indifferent between expanding and 
not expanding her facility,  
     
,, , ,
,, , , 11
D EM E D N E M N E
i n cL L i n cL L i n cL i n cL rK r K s s           . 
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    
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     
 
First, note, that probability s is positive if and only if 
NEE









  hold. 
Secondly, s<1 if and only if  
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Similarly, note that probability r is positive if and only if 
NEE










Finally, note that r<1 if and only if 
 
                               
   
EN E E E
HL L L H
HL NE NE
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(2) 
Let us first analyze the case in which condition
NEE
L L PLE PLE  holds. In this case, probabilities r,sא(0,1) if 









    
and   
E
H









HL L L B PLE BCC PLE PLE    
 
and   
E
H LL CP L EK B C C  . 







L L PLE PLE 
 












































































 , and the vertical intercept is also smaller (absolute value) 
than that of condition (1) since 
E
LH BCC PLE B  and 
NEE





L L PLE PLE  holds, this semiseparating equilibrium with    ,0 , 1 HL pp  can be 
supported for intermediate priors 














  . 
If, in contrast, 
NEE





























   


















  since both expressions have the same slope but the former originates at a higher vertical 
intercept than the latter since 
E
LH BCC PLE B  . Therefore, when 
NEE
L L PLE PLE  holds
 
this semiseparating 
equilibrium with    ,0 , 1 HL pp  can be supported for intermediate priors 
NEE p pp   and expansion costs 
satisfying 





  otherwise. 
 
pH =0 and pLא(0,1). We now check other semiseparating strategy profiles where either type of incumbent does not 




































ent L F   . In the 
case that the entrant observes no expansion from the incumbent, the entrant mixes if and only if his beliefs 
(| ) H Exp 
 
satisfy 
   
,,
,, (| ) ( 1 (| ) ) 0
DN E DN E
ent H ent L HN o E x p F HN o E x p F         
and solving for  (| ) H NoExp  , we obtain
 
(| )





















, where    0,1 L p 
 
for low priors, i.e., 
NE p p  . In addition, pL is 



















 and converging to 
0 lim 1 L p p
  . 
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M NE M E
inc H inc H    and 
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M ED N E M N E
inc L L inc L inc L Ks s       . 
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L inc L inc L BCC    and 
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    
where probability cutoff s satisfies  (0,1) s   if 
E






KK B C C
PLE
 . Hence, this semiseparating equilibrium can be sustained for relatively low priors, 
NE p p  , and expansion costs satisfying 
E
E L
LL L HL E
H
PLE
PLE BCC K K BCC
PLE
  . 
 
pL =0 and pHא(0,1). Let us finally check the strategy profile where only the high-cost incumbent randomizes and 
the low-cost incumbent does not expand. In this case, the entrant’s posterior beliefs after observing expansion are 




ent H F   . In the case that the entrant observes no expansion from 
the incumbent, the entrant mixes if his beliefs  (| ) H NoExp 
 
are such that 
   
,,
,, (| ) ( 1 (| ) ) 0
DN E DN E
ent H ent L HN o E x p F HN o E x p F         
and solving for  (| ) H NoExp  , we obtain
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, where    0,1 H p 
 
for all 
NE p p  . In addition, pH  is increasing 
















 and converging to 
1 lim 1 H p p
  . 
Regarding the low-cost incumbent, she does not expand as prescribed (pL=0) if and only if
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  , where  ˆ (0,1) s for all 
E









 . Hence, this semiseparating strategy profile can be sustained for priors









  .  
 
Appendix 3 – Parametric examples 
Capacity constraint arising from efficiency. Consider a linear inverse demand curve p(Q)=1-Q, and constant 
marginal costs cH=1/5 for the high-cost incumbent (and the entrant) and cL=0 (only for the low-cost incumbent). In 
addition, assume a capacity constraint q =1/8 that the low-cost incumbent cannot exceed. Then, for the high-cost 








i n cH i n cH   under monopoly and duopoly, 
respectively. For the low-cost incumbent, monopoly profits grow from 
,
, () 7 / 6 4
MN E




inc L    as a 
result of expansion, and so do duopoly profits, from 
,
, () 2 7 / 3 2 0
DN E




inc L   . Therefore, cutoff 
expansion costs are 
17 9
46 46 4













HH PLE PLE    for the high-cost incumbent. 
Capacity constraint arising from high demand. Consider a linear inverse demand curve, either high p
H(Q)=1-Q or 
low p
L(Q)=1/3-Q, and constant marginal costs c=0 for both incumbent and entrant. In addition, assume that the 
incumbent only faces a capacity constraint, q =1/8, when operating in a high-demand market since she cannot 








inc L inc L  
 
under monopoly and duopoly, respectively. For the constrained 
high-demand incumbent, monopoly profits grow from 
,
, () 3 / 1 6
MN E




inc H    as a result of expansion, 
and similarly for duopoly profits, which increase from 
,
, () 5 / 4 8
DN E
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Proof of Propositions 1, 2 and 3: 
Pooling equilibrium with no expansion. Let us investigate if the strategy profile { H NoExp , L NoExp } can be 
supported as a pooling PBE of this signaling game. First, the entrant’s beliefs are   (| ) H NExp p    after 
observing no expansion (in equilibrium) and    (| ) 0 , 1 HE x p   after observing expansion (off-the-
equilibrium). Given these beliefs after observing no expansion (in equilibrium) the entrant enters if and only if  
  
,,
,, (1 ) 0
DN E DN E
ent H ent L pF p F      , 
 
where the right-hand side represents the entrant’s profits from staying in the perfectly competitive market (with zero 







DN E DN E








. Note that this cutoff is 
positive and smaller than one, 10
NE p  , since entry costs, F, satisfy 
,,
,,
D NE D NE
ent H ent L F    by definition. Hence, 
after observing no expansion (in equilibrium) the entrant enters the market if 
NE p p  and stays out otherwise. 
Similarly, after observing expansion (off-the-equilibrium), the entrant enters if and only if 
  
,,
,, (1 ) 0
DE DE
ent H ent L FF         

















. Note that this cutoff is positive and smaller 
than one, 10




e n tH e n tL F    is satisfied by definition. Indeed, 
,, ,,
,, ,,
D NE D E D NE D E
ent H ent H ent L ent L F      given that the entrant’s profits are not affected by the (unconstrained) high-
cost incumbent decision to expand, 
,,
,,
D NE D E
e n tH e n tH   , and the entrant’s profits are higher when the low-cost incumbent 
does not expand than when she does, 
,,
,,
D NE D E
ent L ent L   . Hence, after observing expansion (off-the-equilibrium) the 
entrant enters if 
E p    and stays out otherwise. Finally, note that 






ent L ent L NE E
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ent H F   , which holds by definition. Given the 
entrant’s strategies let us now analyze the incumbent: 
 
  If
NE p p   and 
E p    then the entrant does not enter after observing no expansion (in equilibrium) but enters 








L inc L inc L Kq   , where 
,,
,, ()
ED EM N E
LL i n c L i n c L BCC PLE q    . Similarly, 








H inc H inc H K    is satisfied, 
which holds for any expansion cost KH>0. Thus, the strategy profile in which both types of incumbent do not 34 
 
expand their facility can be supported as a pooling PBE in the signaling game if 
E
L LL K BCC PLE  ; as 
described in Proposition 1, Part 3a. 
  If
NE p p   and 
E p    then the entrant does not enter after observing any action from the incumbent. 

















H inc H inc H K     which is satisfied for any KH>0. Thus, this strategy profile 
can be sustained as a pooling PBE in the signaling game if expansion costs satisfy  L L K BCC  ; as described in 
Proposition 1, Part 3b. 
  If
NE p p   and 
E p  then the entrant enters after observing no expansion (in equilibrium) but does not enter 




inc L inc L L qK   , or 
,,
,, ()
M ED N E E
L inc L inc L L L Kq B C C P L E     .  Similarly,  the high-cost incumbent 




inc H inc H H K   , or 
,,
,,
M ED N E E
H inc H inc H H KP L E   . Thus, this strategy 
profile can be supported as a pooling PBE in the signaling game under expansion costs KL>
E
L L BCC PLE   
and KH>
E
H PLE ; as described in Proposition 2a, and Proposition 3. 
  If
NE p p   and 
E p   then the entrant enters after observing any action from the incumbent. Therefore, the 




i n cL i n cL L qK   , or 
,,
,, ()
D E D NE NE E








H inc H inc H K   , which holds for any  H K >0. Thus, this strategy profile 
can be supported as a pooling PBE for expansion costs KL>
NEE
L LL BCC PLE PLE   and KH>0; as described 
in Proposition 2b, and Proposition 3. 
 
 
Separating equilibrium. Let us now consider the separating strategy profile where only the low-cost incumbent 
expands, i.e.,   , H L NotExpand Expand . First, entrant’s updated beliefs become (| )1 HN E x p    and 

















ent L F    , which also holds by definition. Therefore, given the entrant’s responses, 




inc H inc H H K   , or 
,,
,,
M ED N E
H inc H inc H K  . Since 
,, ,,
,, ,,
M ED N EM ED E E
inc H inc H inc H inc H H PLE   given that 
,,
,,
D NE D E
inc H inc H   , we can then 
conclude that the high-cost incumbent does not expand if  
E
HH K PLE  . In contrast, the low-cost incumbent 




inc L inc L L qK    or 
,,
,, ()
M ED N E E
Li n c Li n c L L L Kq B C C P L E     . Thus, 
this strategy profile can be sustained as a separating PBE for expansion costs 
E
HH K PLE  and 
E
L LL K BCC PLE  ; as described in Proposition 1 (Part 1) and Proposition 3. 
For completeness, let us check that the opposite separating strategy profile { , H L Exp NoExp } cannot be supported 
as a PBE of the signaling game. In this case, the entrant’s updated beliefs become  (| )0 HN E x p    and 
















ent L F   , which is satisfied by definition. Given the entrant’s responses, the low-cost 35 
 








L inc L inc L Kq   . On 




inc H inc H H K   , or 
,,,,
,, ,, 0
DE MN E DE ME





M EM N E
inc H inc H   ), which cannot hold for any  0 H K  . Thus, this 
strategy profile cannot be supported as a separating PBE of the signaling game.  
 
Pooling equilibrium with expansion. Let us investigate if the pooling strategy profile in which both types of 
incumbent expand their facility, i.e., { H Exp , L Exp }, can be supported as a PBE of the signaling game. First, the 
entrant’s beliefs are  (| ) H Exp p    after observing expansion (in equilibrium) and    (| ) 0 , 1 HN E x p    
after observing no expansion (off-the-equilibrium). Given these beliefs, after observing expansion, the entrant enters 
if  
   
,,
,, (1 ) 0
DE DE
ent H ent L pF pF      

















E p    from our above discussion. Hence, entry 
ensues after observing expansion if 
E p p   , but does not otherwise. If, instead, the entrant observes no expansion, 
she enters if 
   
,,
,, (1 ) 0
DN E DN E
ent H ent L FF       , 
 







DN E DN E










NE p   holds from our above discussion. Therefore, 
the entrant enters after observing no expansion if 
NE p   , but does not otherwise. Given the entrant’s strategies let 
us now examine the incumbent: 
  If
E p p   and 
NE p   then the entrant enters both after observing expansion and no expansion. Therefore, the 








L inc L inc L Kq   . 








H inc H inc H K   , 
which holds for any expansion costs H K >0. Thus, the strategy profile in which both types of incumbent expand 
cannot be supported as a pooling PBE of the signaling game. 
  If 
E p p  but 
NE p   then the entrant enters after observing expansion (in equilibrium), but does not enter 




i n cL i n cL L qK    , or 
,,
,, ()
D EM N E E








H inc H inc H K    , which holds for all expansion costs  H K >0. Therefore, 
this strategy profile cannot be sustained as a pooling PBE of the signaling game. 
  If 
E p p   but 
NE p   then the entrant does not enter after observing expansion (in equilibrium), but  enters 








L inc L inc L Kq   . Since 
  
,, , , , ,
,, , , ,, () () () ()
NE M E M NE M NE D NE M E D NE
L L i n cL i n cL i n cL i n cL i n cL i n cL BCC PLE q q q q           , 
the low-cost incumbent expands if 
NE
L LL K BCC PLE  . Similarly, the high-cost incumbent expands (as 




inc H inc H H K   , or 
,,
,,
M ED N E N E
















inc H  for the unconstrained high-cost incumbent under monopoly and duopoly, respectively. Thus, this 36 
 
strategy profile can be supported as a pooling PBE under expansion costs 
NE
L LL K BCC PLE   and 
E
HH K PLE  ; as described in Proposition 1, Part 2. 
  If
E p p  and
NE p    then the entrant does not enter after observing any action from the incumbent. Therefore, 
















H inc H inc H K    , which holds for any expansion cost H K >0. Thus, this 
strategy profile cannot be sustained as a pooling PBE. 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 4: 
Pooling equilibrium with no expansion. Let us investigate if the pooling strategy profile { H NoExp , L NoExp } 
can be supported as a pooling PBE of this signaling game. First, the entrant’s beliefs are   (| ) H NExp p    after 
observing no expansion (in equilibrium) and    (| ) 0 , 1 HE x p  
 
after observing expansion (off-the-
equilibrium). Given these beliefs after observing no expansion (in equilibrium) the entrant enters if and only if  
  
,,
,, (1 ) 0
DN E DN E
ent H ent L pF p F      , 
 
where the right-hand side represents the entrant’s profits from staying in the perfectly competitive market (with zero 







DN E DN E








. Note that this cutoff is 
positive and smaller than one, 10
NE p  , since entry costs, F, satisfy 
,,
,,
D NE D NE
ent H ent L F    by definition. Hence, 
after observing no expansion (in equilibrium) the entrant enters the market if 
NE p p  and stays out otherwise. 
Similarly, after observing expansion (off-the-equilibrium), the entrant enters if and only if 
  
,,
,, (1 ) 0
DE DE
ent H ent L FF         

















. Note that this cutoff is positive and smaller 
than one, 10




e n tH e n tL F    is satisfied by definition. Indeed, 
,, ,,
,, ,,
D NE D E D NE D E
ent H ent H ent L ent L F      given that the entrant’s profits are not affected by the (unconstrained) low-
demand incumbent decision to expand, 
,,
,,
D NE D E
ent L ent L   , and the entrant’s profits are higher when the high-demand 
incumbent does not expand than when she does, 
,,
,,
D NE D E
e n tH e n tH   . Hence, after observing expansion (off-the-
equilibrium) the entrant enters if 
E p    and stays out otherwise. Finally, note that 
NEE p p   as it shown in the 
proof of Proposition 1. 
 
Given the entrant’s strategies let us now analyze the incumbent: 
 
  If
NE p p   and 
E p     then the entrant does not enter after observing no expansion (in equilibrium) but enters 








H inc H inc H Kq   , where 
,,
,, ()
ED E M N E
H H inc H inc H BCC PLE q    . 








Li n c Li n c L K    is 
satisfied, which holds for any expansion cost KL>0. Thus, the strategy profile in which both types of incumbent 37 
 
do not expand their facility can be supported as a pooling PBE in the signaling game if 
E
HH H K BCC PLE   
. 
  If
NE p p   and 
E p    then the entrant does not enter after observing any action from the incumbent. 








H inc H inc H H Kq B C C    . Similarly, the low-demand incumbent prefers 








L inc L inc L K     which is satisfied for any KL>0. Thus, 
this strategy profile can be sustained as a pooling PBE in the signaling game if expansion costs satisfy 
HH K BCC  . 
  If
NE p p   and 
E p  then the entrant enters after observing no expansion (in equilibrium) but does not enter 




i n cH i n cH H qK   , or 
,,
,, ()
M ED N E E
H inc H inc H H H Kq B C C P L E     .  Similarly,  the low-demand 




inc L inc L L K   , or 
,,
,,
M ED N E E
Li n c Li n c L L KP L E    . Thus, this 
strategy profile can be supported as a pooling PBE  in the signaling game under expansion costs KH>
E
HH BCC PLE   and KL>
E
L PLE . 
  If
NE p p   and 
E p   then the entrant enters after observing any action from the incumbent. Therefore, the 




i n cH i n cH H qK   , or 
,,
,, ()
D E D NE NE E









L inc L inc L K    , which holds for any  L K >0. Thus, this strategy profile 
can be supported as a pooling PBE for expansion costs KH>
NEE
HH H BCC PLE PLE   and KL>0. 
 
 
Separating equilibrium. Let us now consider the separating strategy profile where only the high-demand 
incumbent expands, i.e.,   , H L Expand NotExpand . First, entrant’s updated beliefs become (| )0 HN E x p    and 
















ent L F    , which also holds by definition. Therefore, given the entrant’s responses, the low-demand incumbent 




inc L inc L L K   , or 
,,
,,
M ED N E
Li n c Li n c L K  . Since 
,, ,,
,, ,,
M ED N EM ED E E
inc L inc L inc L inc L L PLE      given that 
,,
,,
D NE D E
inc L inc L   , we can then conclude that the high-demand 
incumbent does not expand if  
E





i n cH i n cH H qK    or 
,,
,, ()
M ED N E E
H i n cH i n cH H H Kq B C C P L E     . Thus, this strategy profile can be 
sustained as a separating PBE for expansion costs 
E
L L K PLE  and 
E
HH H K BCC PLE  . 
For completeness, let us check that the opposite separating strategy profile { , H L NoExp Exp } cannot be supported 
as a PBE of the signaling game. In this case, the entrant’s updated beliefs become  (| )1 HN E x p    and 
















ent H F   , which is satisfied by definition. Given the entrant’s responses, the high-demand 








H inc H inc H Kq   . 








DE MN E DE ME





M EM N E
inc H inc H   ), which cannot hold for any  0 L K  . Thus, this 
strategy profile cannot be supported as a separating PBE of the signaling game.  
 
Pooling equilibrium with expansion. Let us investigate if the pooling strategy profile in which both types of 
incumbent expand their facility, i.e., { H Exp , L Exp }, can be supported as a PBE of the signaling game. First, the 
entrant’s beliefs are  (| ) H Exp p    after observing expansion (in equilibrium) and    (| ) 0 , 1 HN E x p    
after observing no expansion (off-the-equilibrium). Given these beliefs, after observing expansion, the entrant enters 
if  
   
,,
,, (1 ) 0
DE DE
ent H ent L pF pF      

















E p    from our above discussion. Hence, entry 
ensues after observing expansion if 
E p p   , but does not otherwise. If, instead, the entrant observes no expansion, 
she enters if 
   
,,
,, (1 ) 0
DN E DN E
ent H ent L FF       , 
 







DN E DN E










NE p   holds from our above discussion. Therefore, 
the entrant enters after observing no expansion if 
NE p   , but does not otherwise. Given the entrant’s strategies let 
us now examine the incumbent: 
  If
E p p   and 
NE p   then the entrant enters both after observing expansion and no expansion. Therefore, the 
















L inc L inc L K    , which holds for any expansion costs L K >0. Thus, the strategy profile in which both 
types of incumbent expand cannot be supported as a pooling PBE of the signaling game. 
  If 
E p p  but 
NE p   then the entrant enters after observing expansion (in equilibrium), but does not enter 








D EM N E E








Li n c Li n c L K    , which holds for all expansion costs  L K >0. Therefore, this 
strategy profile cannot be sustained as a pooling PBE of the signaling game. 
  If 
E p p   but 
NE p   then the entrant does not enter after observing expansion (in equilibrium), but enters 









H inc H inc H Kq   . Since 
   
,, , , , ,
,, , , ,, () () () ()
NE M E M NE M NE D NE M E D NE
H H i n cH i n cH i n cH i n cH i n cH i n cH BCC PLE q q q q           , 
the high-demand incumbent expands if 
NE
HH H K BCC PLE . Similarly, the low-demand incumbent expands 




inc L inc L L K   , or 
,,
,,
M E D NE NE
















inc L  for the unconstrained low-demand incumbent under monopoly and duopoly, respectively. Thus, 
this strategy profile can be supported as a pooling PBE under expansion costs 
NE
HH H K BCC PLE  and 
E
L L K PLE  . 39 
 
  If
E p p  and
NE p    then the entrant does not enter after observing any action from the incumbent. Therefore, 
















L inc L inc L K    , which holds for any expansion cost L K >0. Thus, this 
strategy profile cannot be sustained as a pooling PBE. 
 
 
Proof of Corollary 1: 
Pooling equilibrium with no expansion. Let us investigate if the strategy profile { H NoExp , L NoExp } can be 
supported as a pooling PBE of this signaling game. First, the entrant’s beliefs are   (| ) H NExp p    after 
observing no expansion (in equilibrium) and    (| ) 0 , 1 HE x p   after observing expansion (off-the-
equilibrium). Given these beliefs after observing no expansion (in equilibrium) the entrant enters if and only if  
  
,,
,, (1 ) 0
DN E DN E
ent H ent L pF p F      , 
 
where the right-hand side represents the entrant’s profits from staying in the perfectly competitive market (with zero 







DN E DN E












DN E DN E
ent H ent L F    by definition, i.e., the entrant enters if the low-cost incumbent does not expand, 
but stays out otherwise. Hence, the entrant enters after observing no expansion, for all parameter values. After 
observing expansion (off-the-equilibrium), the entrant enters if and only if 
  
,,
,, (1 ) 0
DE DE
ent H ent L FF         

















. Note that this cutoff is positive and smaller 
than one,10




e n tH e n tL F    is satisfied by definition. Indeed, 
,, ,,
,, ,,
D NE D E D NE D E
ent H ent H ent L ent L F      given that the entrant’s profits are not affected by the (unconstrained) high-
cost incumbent decision to expand, 
,,
,,
D NE D E
e n tH e n tH   , and the entrant’s profits are higher when the low-cost incumbent 
does not expand than when she does, 
,,
,,
D NE D E
ent L ent L   . Hence, after observing expansion (off-the-equilibrium) the 
entrant enters if 
E p    and stays out otherwise. 
Given the entrant’s strategies let us now analyze the incumbent: 
  If 
E p   then the entrant enters after observing no expansion (in equilibrium) but does not enter otherwise. 




inc L inc L L qK   , or 
,,
,, ()
M ED N E E
L inc L inc L L L Kq B C C P L E     .  Similarly,  the high-cost incumbent 




inc H inc H H K   , or 
,,
,,
M ED N E E
H inc H inc H H KP L E   . Thus, this strategy 
profile can be supported as a pooling PBE in the signaling game under expansion costs KL>
E
L L BCC PLE   
and KH>
E
H PLE ; as described in Proposition 2a. 
  If 
E p    then the entrant enters after observing any action from the incumbent. Therefore, the low-cost 




i n cL i n cL L qK   , or 
,,
,, ()
D E D NE NE E








H inc H inc H K   , which holds for any  H K >0. Thus, this strategy profile 40 
 
can be supported as a pooling PBE for expansion costs KL>
NEE
L LL BCC PLE PLE   and KH>0; as described 
in Proposition 2b. 
 
 
Separating equilibrium. Let us now consider the separating strategy profile where only the low-cost incumbent 
expands, i.e.,   , H L NotExpand Expand . First, entrant’s updated beliefs become (| )1 HN E x p    and 

















ent L F    , which also holds by definition. Therefore, given the entrant’s responses, 




inc H inc H H K   , or 
,,
,,
M ED N E
H inc H inc H K  . Since 
,, ,,
,, ,,
M ED N EM ED E E
inc H inc H inc H inc H H PLE   given that 
,,
,,
D NE D E
inc H inc H   , we can then 
conclude that the high-cost incumbent does not expand if  
E
HH K PLE  . In contrast, the low-cost incumbent 




inc L inc L L qK    or 
,,
,, ()
M ED N E E
Li n c Li n c L L L Kq B C C P L E     . Thus, 
this strategy profile can be sustained as a separating PBE for expansion costs 
E
HH K PLE  and 
E
L LL K BCC PLE  ; as described in Proposition 1, Part 1. 
For completeness, let us check that the opposite separating strategy profile { , H L Exp NoExp } cannot be supported 
as a PBE of the signaling game. In this case, the entrant’s updated beliefs become  (| )0 HN E x p    and 
















ent L F   , which is satisfied by definition. Given the entrant’s responses, the low-cost 








L inc L inc L Kq   . On 




inc H inc H H K   , or 
,, ,,
,, ,, 0
DE DN E DE DE





D ED N E
inc H inc H   ), which cannot hold for any  0 H K  . Thus, this 
strategy profile cannot be supported as a separating PBE of the signaling game.  
 
Pooling equilibrium with expansion. Let us investigate if the pooling strategy profile in which both types of 
incumbent expand their facility, i.e., { H Exp , L Exp }, can be supported as a PBE of the signaling game. First, the 
entrant’s beliefs are  (| ) H Exp p    after observing expansion (in equilibrium) and    (| ) 0 , 1 HN E x p    
after observing no expansion (off-the-equilibrium). Given these beliefs, after observing expansion, the entrant enters 
if  
   
,,
,, (1 ) 0
DE DE
ent H ent L pF pF      

















E p    from our above discussion. Hence, entry 
ensues after observing expansion if 
E p p   , but does not otherwise. If, instead, the entrant observes no expansion, 
he enters if 
   
,,
,, (1 ) 0
DN E DN E
ent H ent L FF       , 
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, where  0
NE p  holds from our above discussion. Therefore, the 
entrant enters after observing no expansion under all parameter values. Given the entrant’s strategies let us now 
examine the incumbent: 
  If
E p p   then the entrant enters both after observing expansion and no expansion. Therefore, the low-cost 








L inc L inc L Kq   . 








H inc H inc H K   , 
which holds for any expansion costs H K >0. Thus, the strategy profile in which both types of incumbent expand 
cannot be supported as a pooling PBE of the signaling game. 
  If 
E p p   then the entrant does not enter after observing expansion (in equilibrium), but  enters otherwise. 








L inc L inc L Kq   . Since 
  
,, , , , ,
,, , , ,, () () () ()
NE M E M NE M NE D NE M E D NE
L L i n cL i n cL i n cL i n cL i n cL i n cL BCC PLE q q q q           , 
the low-cost incumbent expands if 
NE
L LL K BCC PLE  . Similarly, the high-cost incumbent expands (as 




inc H inc H H K   , or 
,,
,,
M ED N E N E
















inc H  for the unconstrained high-cost incumbent under monopoly and duopoly, respectively. Thus, this 
strategy profile can be supported as a pooling PBE under expansion costs 
NE
L LL K BCC PLE   and 
H L KK  ; as described in Proposition 1, Part 2. 
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